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On Sunday, August 27, 2006, 49 of the 50 people aboard Comair Flight 5191 died when the plane crashed after taking off from the wrong runway at Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky.  Clarence Fortney, an employee of AirTran Airways was on that flight.   Fortney, who lived in Lexington, Kentucky but worked for AirTran in Atlanta, was flying to work via  another carrier (Comair) under a reciprocal agreement (AirTran did not fly into nor out of Kentucky).  AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Fortney, No. 2008-CA-001223-WC.

Even though the fatality occurred while Fortney was traveling to work, his estate argued that the death should be deemed work-related under the “convenience to the employer” doctrine, while AirTran argued that under the “benefit to the employer” doctrine, it should prevail as it was Mr. Fortney who benefited from its agreement with Comair regarding transportation to and from his workplace, not AirTran.

The ALJ found that it was Fortney, not AirTran who received the benefit of Fortney’s traveling from Lexington to Atlanta holding:

“. . . [T]he providing of free or reduced fare flights on other airlines through the Reciprocal Jumpseat Travel Agreement and Reduce Fare Travel Agreement was a benefit AirTran provided to its employees to allow them to live where they chose. The providing of this benefit to the employees was a burden on AirTran, as the company was required to be familiar with and follow the tax law of numerous states when employees chose to live in other states and make use of the free or reduced fare flights to commute to work.”

The Workers’ Compensation Board reversed, holding:

1. Mr. Fortney’s presence on the Comair flight being either caused by or a requirement of his employment with AirTran;

2. AirTran also benefited from the transportation, thus entitling Mr. Fortney to the “benefit to the employer” exception; and

3. The “employer convenience doctrine” was applicable since AirTran can also be said to have “controlled” the conveyance.

In an opinion to be published, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board, finding that the facts did not fall under the employer convenience doctrine since Fortney benefited from the reciprocal jumpseat agreement by being able to live wherever he chose. In short, the Court held: “Mr. Fortney was going to his workplace when the accident occurred. It would have been no different had he had (sic) been driving. Thus, the ‘going and coming’ rule applies.” It further noted, “AirTran . . . could have required him to move to Atlanta. Clearly, the agreement benefited Mr. Fortney, not AirTran.”

All judges concurred.